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The Community of Solitude 
by Christopher Pulte 
Abstract 
This paper re-examines the egos of Edmund Husserl and Max Scheler with reference to Friedrich 
Nietzsche and the psychologist, James Hillman, and in the process also confronts the ego in other of 
its many manifestations, misappropriations, and mystifications. 
The ego is a multi-headed enigma which defies phenomenological description, and only reaches 
the status of concept by virtue of the gropings of an epistemology which is not up to the task. The 
goal of this paper is twofold: firstly, to come to terms with what is commonly spoken of as ego, 
and secondly, to devise a scheme which does justice to it as phenomenon. 
The Community of Solitude 
Perhaps the way in which Descartes himself was shaken by the discovery of this ego is 
significant as an indication to us lesser spirits that something truly great, indeed of the 
greatest magnitude, is announced in it, something which should one day emerge, through 
all the errors and confusions, as the “Archimedean point” of any genuine philosophy. 
  (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 80) 
Introduction 
Like many a concept whose charm lies in its very 
intangibility, the most compelling evidence for the 
existence of the ego is to be found in language 
production. An individual consists of any number of 
different egos, all of which somehow fall under the 
jurisdiction of the first person singular, “I”. And who 
seriously believes that language guarantees unity across 
a range of conspicuously distinct entities that happen 
to share the same word? While it probably is wrong to 
dismiss the ego as a fiction, it is difficult to imagine how 
such dissimilar manifestations could be faces of the 
same ego, even though they may bear some relation to 
one another. 
In a partial list of themes that might fall under the 
heading of “ego”, there are egos of “inner perception”, 
as, for instance, in Husserl’s “ego acts” of “striving 
towards realization” in predication (Husserl, 1939/1973, 
p. 82) or ego that “holds sway” over the “kinaesthetically
functioning living body” (Husserl, 1954/1970, pp. 106-
107), and Scheler’s “vital feelings”, a “lived body ego”
not reducible to “sensible feelings”, as in emotional as
opposed to physical pain (Scheler, 1916/1973a, p. 339).
There is a language based ego of consciousness, the
“speaking subject”1 (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p.
183). And, if the reader will allow, at the root of
Heidegger’s authenticity, there may even be an ego
which makes itself known through anxiety and serves
1 “What I communicate with primarily is not ‘representation’ 
or thought, but a speaking subject, with a certain style of 
being and with the ‘world’ at which he directs his aim.” 
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as a reminder that self is inherently finite and destined 
to perish. There is something like a corporeal ego in the 
instinct for self-preservation, which shows itself in the 
physical response of fear, and something like a social 
ego which makes itself felt in the blush of self-
consciousness. Finally, there is the ego of “egoism”, an 
unconscious comparison and determination of rank in 
which we weigh ourselves against others. 
This manifold thing, “ego”, which we think of as 
singular, traverses mind and body, and body and soul, 
realms long established as distinct and separate. Yet, 
as distant as these particular realms, and as dissimilar 
as these particular egos, are from one another, could it 
be that they are ultimately one and the same? Or is it 
more likely that the ego does not exist at all, but rather 
is an empty construct, and that, if we were to look 
“beneath the chatter of words” to the “primordial 
silence” (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. 184), we would 
find nothing? The Cartesian ego occupies a rather 
ambiguous place in phenomenology as something from 
which it has arisen both from and against. In Husserl, 
the ego is the mirror by which phenomena are made 
transparent, while in Heidegger the ego is a non-entity, 
and transparency an essential property of Dasein itself 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 372). What would remain of 
phenomenology without a doctrine of intersubjectivity, 
and what is intersubjectivity without a subject? How can 
we remain true to Merleau-Ponty’s stated goal of freeing 
philosophy from “doctrines” of the “autonomy of 
consciousness” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, pp. 3-4) while 
retaining the Cartesian ego? 
The Thinking Subject and the Speaking Subject 
While there are time-honoured intellectual practices 
that would posit thinker as producer of thought and 
speaker as producer of speech, phenomenologically 
speaking, neither of these exists. We can speak with 
confidence of ego acts and of thought images – 
mental acts which can never be mistaken for actual 
acts, and thought images which can never be mistaken 
for perceived images; nevertheless, these are set in 
motion by unknown forces and arise from a place that 
we can name, but never directly apprehend. The thinking 
and the speaking subject are conceptual shorthand that 
we employ as a matter of convenience in order to draw 
a distinction, and as entities should never be mistaken 
as “proximally given” in the Heideggerian sense (see 
Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 72). And, since the “thinking 
subject” and the “speaking subject” are a source of 
confusion, if not outright disagreement, there it is very 
good reason to make this distinction as clear as possible. 
It was Merleau-Ponty who said, “A thought limited to 
existing for itself, independently of the constraints of 
speech and communication, would no sooner appear 
than it would sink into the unconscious, which means 
that it would not exist even for itself” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1945/1962, p. 177). Putting aside any insinuation that 
language is somehow essential to thought – unconscious 
thought not only is possible, but is, beyond doubt, the 
most common kind of thought – Merleau-Ponty, in 
agreement with Nietzsche2, would seem to endorse 
the relatively modest claim that consciousness is a by-
product of language, and that thoughts, or ego acts, if the 
reader will allow, are opaque. What this would seem to 
suggest is that, while it is the thinking subject who acts, 
it is the speaking subject who makes visible. In other 
words, an ego act and the image of it are separable. And 
this is true not only for thoughts, but for any other act. 
Perception itself may be considered an act that is made 
transparent through the power of language. 
Consciousness does not occur without a subject who 
acts with the intention of pointing things out to others. 
Whether by gesture, words, music, dance, or any other 
art form, our whole world is gilded, as it were, with a 
surface meaning ... or rather becomes gilded in the act 
of turning to it for the purpose of expression. Act and 
image are forever intertwined, whether it is in ego acts, 
in physical acts, or in the act of perception. In putting 
things into words, we are compelled to image them, and 
this imaging is a withdrawal that produces a dichotomy 
that exists in whatever is made visible, and in the same 
manner that dance reaches for expression by means of 
an inwardness that might be characterized as narcissistic. 
A pointer to this can be found in Piaget’s observation 
that, up until the age of eight years, a child’s speech is 
“egocentric”. Until then, “He talks either for himself or 
for the pleasure of associating anyone who happens to 
be there with the activity of the moment” (Piaget, 1923/ 
1926, p. 9). Merleau-Ponty goes as far as to assert that 
“the same egocentric, autistic, syncretic thinking” can 
be found in an adult “as soon as his thinking must go 
beyond the domain of the acquired in order to express 
new notions” (Merleau-Ponty, 1964/1973, p. 60). 
Just as any movement can be transformed into a 
meaningful gesture, a thing perceived can be pointed out 
and made visible to others, and this pointing out results 
in an image. As Heidegger (1927/1962) emphasised, 
seeing is different from perceiving3, and all seeing is a 
being with others. A scene shared with one’s beloved is 
seen differently from a scene viewed alone, even though 
both are perceived in exactly the same manner ... the 
difference being that, in the former, the object perceived 
2  “For the longest time, conscious thought was considered 
thought itself. Only now does the truth dawn on us that 
by far the greatest part of our spirit’s activity remains 
unconscious and unfelt.” (Nietzsche, 1887/1974, p. 262) 
3 “‘Seeing’ does not mean just perceiving with the bodily 
eyes, but neither does it mean pure non-sensory awareness 
of something present-at-hand. In giving an existential 
signification to ‘sight’, we have merely drawn upon the 
peculiar feature of seeing.” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 187) 
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is infused with an ego presence. Both Merleau-Ponty 
and Heidegger, in as far as they go, are correct. With 
Merleau-Ponty, we would insist that perception and 
the lived body are prior and that imagery is simply a 
resonance that follows thereafter. Along with Heidegger, 
however, we would claim that it is in this resonance 
that meaning is discovered. Seeing is not superior to 
perceiving, and neither is perceiving more vital than 
imagination. They, simply, are of a different order. 
 
Contrary to Heidegger, seeing – which is to say, 
consciousness – is not a constant, but rather is limited to 
communicative acts. We live in a darkened room which 
only seems lit because we cannot turn to it without first 
turning on the lights! The contention here is that being 
with others is not as much something we exist in, but 
something that we exist towards. Being in the world is 
to be alone, and it is the existential condition of being 
alone that governs our thoughts, ego movements which 
labour to overcome this primordial solitude in order to 
communicate themselves to others. Our relation to things 
is not primarily one of communication but rather one of 
perception and motor projects: the taking of things in 
hand to put them to use, the corporeal connections that 
constitute things, and a mysterious aptitude for accessing 
actions relating to them. Lived experience is determined 
by faculties that operate independent of consciousness, 
and, in the act of communication, this unspoken world 
is left behind to be replaced by the world as expressed. 
 
Ego as Selfhood 
 
Philosophical tradition, from Plato and Aristotle to the 
present day, has always conflated the speaking with the 
thinking subject, transparency with thought, logic with 
dialectics; but even those who would not draw such a 
distinction should clearly recognize that the egos of 
epistemology are distinct from and peripheral to the 
ego of selfhood. Although “mental” is still presumed 
to mean “psychic”, and consciousness still has a seat 
as pilot and navigator, selfhood is regarded as involving 
more than thought. While epistemic egos may have 
some connection to the ego of selfhood, there being no 
there in selfhood in which to form an identity around, 
the exercise becomes one not of locating an apodictically 
given self, but of ascertaining the manner in which self-
hood is arrived at. A dubious enterprise, to be sure, and 
one which this paper would not even attempt if one of 
the founders of the phenomenological movement, Max 
Scheler, had not made a start of it (and which, in fact, 
seems quite central to his philosophy of a non-formal 
ethics). And, even though there is much in it that does 
not seem to belong in phenomenology, he calls attention 
to themes which are in need of clarification. 
 
For Scheler, we come by self “in the actus re-flexivus 
in which knowledge of the knowledge of things is 
added to the knowledge of things” (Scheler, 1973b p. 
295). He rejects the idea that consciousness is a “primal 
fact”, and speaks of the reflective act as something that 
“grows out of conspicuous resistances, clashes, and 
oppositions – in sum, out of pronounced suffering” (pp. 
294-295). There are numerous objections to this claim 
that can and ought to be raised. It appears that “the act of 
being thrown back on the self” is something “probably 
only possible for men” (p. 294) and beyond the capacity 
of animals, children, and primitives. In addition, pre-
reflective “purely ecstatic [ekstatische] knowledge” is 
“difficult to reproduce” in “mature, civilized men, 
whether in memory, reverie, perception, thought, or 
empathetic identification” (p. 294). Furthermore, this 
same self, which is to say the subject, also constitutes the 
object. “Whenever self-consciousness and consciousness 
of an object arise, they do so simultaneously and through 
the same process” (p. 298). 
 
Self as “knowledge of knowledge”, a reflective act 
which constitutes the object, and one which cuts us off 
from the primal grounds through which objects become 
objectified: none of this seems particularly phenomeno-
logical. Surely it is premature to identify the ego of 
selfhood with the ego of epistemology, and surely an 
object remains an object regardless of whether one is 
in possession of the “knowledge of the knowledge of 
things”. But, above all, to follow in the footsteps of 
Merleau-Ponty, it must be maintained that perception 
is primordial, and remains primordially accessible 
regardless of a developed sense of self. The limits of self 
are discovered in much the way that the boundaries of 
our world are discovered through the body, and psychic 
pain might apply in the way a bump on the head is a 
serviceable reminder of a low doorway, and a burned 
finger a lesson for a child ignorant of the dangers of an 
open flame. But the resistance we meet in our dealings 
with others has no obvious bearing on philosophical 
reflection, and surely is met as equally by women as it is 
by men, even though knowledge of life’s parameters is 
certainly less developed in children. 
 
Self as the sum total of a history of involvements with 
others makes some sense, and such a process would 
most certainly involve pain, which is to say the psychic 
pain that is experienced in conflict with others. A sense 
of self would develop out of a history of painful experi-
ences which inform us of our standing in the world. As 
we take the estimations of others to heart even when 
mind rebels, what we are speaking of here are two very 
clearly distinct egos, one of the heart and the other of 
the mind. Further, we would like to put forward the 
proposition that psychic pain not only is distinct from 
physical pain, but is derived from it, in that psychic pain 
is physical pain that has been taken to heart. In other 
words, in keeping with Merleau-Ponty, “The perceived 
world is the always presupposed foundation of all 
rationality, all value and all existence” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964, p. 13). Thus, we would maintain that the contents 
of both heart and mind have the same source, namely, 
the body. 
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Scheler did not have this in mind when he spoke of 
“passionate love” as being “completely different from 
sensible feeling” (Scheler, 1916/1973a, p. 340). Consider 
romantic love, however. How is it possible to account 
for the manner in which an appetite sublimates into 
passion and physical desire is displaced by regard for 
another’s selfhood? And there is no question that love 
derives from sexuality and that sexuality is the element 
that distinguishes it from mere friendship. Given that 
love is constituted differently from sexuality, what is it 
that precipitates it? Not any need to be with others in 
what Nietzsche derogatorily calls “herd instinct”, this 
kind of attraction not being felt for just anybody. It 
cannot be merely sexual: a short-lived desire which 
focuses on the attractions of the body. Passionate love 
involves a regard for excellence and the need to be in a 
particular ego presence. Does it not seem that body 
crosses over into heart in the same way that it crosses 
over into mind, and may not mind and heart somehow 
be of the same substance? Mind as it pertains to things, 
and heart as it pertains to others? 
 
Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) suggests that an inherent  
“genius for ambiguity” is definitive of human being: 
 
Everything is both manufactured and natural 
in man, as it were, in the sense that there is 
not a word, not a form of behaviour which 
does not owe something to purely biological 
being – and which at the same time does not 
elude the simplicity of animal life, and causes 
forms of vital behaviour to deviate from their 
pre-ordained direction, through some sort of 
leakage and through a genius for ambiguity 
which might serve to define man. (p. 189) 
 
What is this “genius” if not the same faculty that 
grants us the power to love? And might not such a 
transmutation be similar if not identical to the way that 
motility is appropriated into the ego movements of 
thought? All thought is directed at acts to be taken in 
the world, and its ego movements are modelled on acts 
performed by the body. Given that an ego movement, an 
image held in the mind of an action to be taken, is not 
the same as the act itself, then it must exist on a separate 
plane from the physical; and since love clearly is distinct 
from the carnality of the body, could it be that somehow 
heart shares the same point of convergence as mind? 
 
Ego as Social 
 
Scheler distinguishes the “stratum of vital feelings” from 
“psychic feelings” by their ego connectedness. “A 
psychic feeling does not become a state or function of 
the ego by virtue of my going through the givenness of 
my lived body and comprehending my lived body as 
‘my own’ ...” (1916/1973a, p. 342). He posits that, in 
vital feelings, there is an ego identity that is maintained 
across psychic states, and when this identity is sound, we 
have feelings of “well-being”, but when this identity is 
compromised we have feelings of depression. In vital 
feelings “we feel our life itself, its ‘growth’, its ‘decline’, 
its ‘illness’, its ‘health’, and its ‘future’ ...” (p. 340). 
Vital feelings are “owned” and ownership is communal 
in that something is my very own by distinction of not 
being shared with others. Psychic suffering is felt when 
this ownership is violated. The body can be wracked by 
illness, but the ego of vital feelings can remain intact, or 
even flourish. “Purely psychic feelings”, on the other 
hand, “are subject to their own laws of oscillation” and 
have a “pathological ‘capriciousness’ ...” (p. 342). In 
Scheler’s distinction, psychic feeling are those without 
the “connections of understanding” of vital feelings, 
and a person whose “continuity of feeling continually 
breaks away from changing emotional states of the lived 
body is as incomprehensible as someone who is severely 
disturbed mentally” (p. 342). 
 
Scheler certainly is correct in dismissing pathology as 
“incomprehensible”, but in this he remains far too 
Cartesian, in that he accepts that our waking states are, 
for the most part, a “continuity of feelings”. Scheler 
would be among the last to recognize that this forging of 
an identity across every transition, every boundary, and 
every contradiction is a moral burden. And, to be sure, 
ego identity can be quite malleable and potent. But, 
regardless, such ownership is secured in a different 
manner from the sense of self that is bestowed on us in 
our dealings with others. It is one of many illusions that 
govern modern life, and one which has significant 
consequences in our dealings with others; for, despite all 
attempts at integration, we are not a single ego, but are, 
in fact, multiple egos, each of which has its own moral 
tenor. 
 
When speaking of an egoist, what is commonly meant is 
a person whose self-estimation runs contrary to others’ 
estimation of him or her. The “good” man of Aristotle 
is the golden mean between two extremes, one being the 
man “who thinks himself worthy of great things, being 
unworthy of them” and the other being “the man who 
thinks himself worthy of less than he is really worthy 
of” (Aristotle, pp. 89-90). Namely, a man is good by 
virtue of having a high opinion of himself which he 
deserves. An ego is egotistical only when it demands 
what others are unwilling to pay. One can either under-
estimate or overestimate self-worth; but, in either case, 
an ego which exists in defiance of the estimation of 
others is Cartesian in its insularity. An ideology which 
gives license to private evaluation over the evaluation of 
others is most certainly disruptive of social cohesion, 
and an ego that is so encapsulated in solitude that it 
neglects to actively carve out a place for itself in the 
world among others can hardly be a picture of health. 
 
The question is whether solitude is separable from the 
ego, or whether perhaps the unnatural growth of the ego 
is due to some other contributing factor. The isolation of 
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individualism is a well enough recognized component of 
modern society that it may not be necessary to labour 
the point that solitude did not exist in ancient and, more 
certainly, prehistoric times to the same extent that it does 
now. And it is not at all difficult to imagine a society 
where the ties of community are so strong that a private 
intellectual life is neglected or driven underground to the 
point where it has no function. In fact, this is the state of 
affairs in societies in most parts of the world even today, 
even in societies where outward respect is paid to the 
individual. The question is whether an ego that acts 
without self-awareness or artifice is an ego, or whether 
without an element of insularity we would speak of 
egoism at all; that, if fully integrated into society, an ego 
would be characterized as something quite different. 
 
It is not too difficult to see how a certain good-natured 
modesty would accept the estimation of others at face 
value, whether for good or for ill, and that personhood, 
even in the most individualistic of societies, is not self-
determined, but acquired from something like an ego 
response to the estimation of others; that the creation of 
a selfhood separate from this public ego is as tenuous as 
it is rare. What is not rare, however, is the ego which 
chafes under the opinion of others with whom it comes 
into contact. And all too tangible is the simmering 
resentment of those who are dissatisfied with their 
station in life. This is generally spoken of as being ego 
driven, and such resentment is all too easy to associate 
with Nietzsche’s will to power, even though such an 
ego clearly is a drive in its unfulfilled form and which of 
itself may be not only benign, but life promoting. 
 
The question, thus, is whether the ego of egoism is an 
irreducible given or a blend of primal elements. While it 
seems true enough that “One furthers one’s ego always 
at the expense of others”, does it necessarily follow from 
this that, as Nietzsche (1901/1967) maintained, “Life 
always lives at the expense of other life” (p. 194)? Is it 
indeed possible to conceive of excellence that does not 
excel over others? Goodness that does not put others to 
shame? Achievements that do not make others’ pale by 
comparison? Certainly the weighing of egos in some-
thing like a test of strength is an undeniable component 
of social intercourse, even though the implications of 
dominance, subordination, and the bickering involved in 
their determination, seem more like an argument against 
life than the affirmation of it. And is power really the 
essence of life? Or, rather, is it not more like something 
expended in the pursuit of it? 
 
Other than euphemism and dysphemism, little in fact 
distinguishes Scheler’s vital feelings from Nietzsche’s 
will to power. To be sure, vital feelings do not come at 
the expense of others and they “can contribute to the 
foundation of a consciousness of community” (Scheler, 
1916/1973a, p. 340). Still, as forged in “pain”, one has 
to wonder how self can possibly be “thrown back on 
itself” without the “opposition” of other selves pursuing 
dominance over it. As a primordial drive, Nietzsche’s 
will to power is no more bound to materialism than are 
vital feelings. People can possess “health, food, a place 
to live, entertainment”, and yet “remain unhappy and 
low spirited”. Take everything from them, however, but 
satisfy the “demon of power”, and they will be “almost 
happy” (Nietzsche, 1881/1997, p. 146). In Scheler’s vital 
feelings, “we can feel an increase in vitality” even 
“during a long and painful illness” (Scheler, 1916/1973a, 
p. 340). But such “health” surely is determined by one’s 
standing with others in community; and whether stand-
ing as such is “demon” or angel would depend only on 
whether it is forcibly taken or whether it is freely given. 
 
Scheler hardly does Nietzsche justice when he accuses 
him of committing the same “errors of a false and one-
sided biology and psychology” as Darwin and Spencer, 
even though it is understandable how he came to this 
conclusion (Scheler, 1916/1973a, p. 278). His disdain 
might be justified if the will to power were intended as 
a political doctrine rather than a psychological principle. 
There is nothing fatal to Nietzsche in Scheler’s belief 
that “the correct conception of life as a tendency to 
‘power’ does not preclude the possibility that partici-
pation in and sympathy with other life-processes also 
belong to the original tendencies of life”, nor in his 
claim that “communities become diseased or senile to 
the degree that egoism becomes their ruling principle” 
(p. 279). And it is almost a Nietzscheism for Scheler to 
assert that “certain experiences – e.g., disappointment in 
an original trust, the experience of illness which directs 
all attention to one’s own body, etc. – and the simulta-
neous rationalization of certain vital experiences ... lead 
to the phenomenon of ‘egoism’” (p. 279). 
 
The ego, even at its darkest and most solitary, is – 
paradoxically – social and seeks the light. A healthy ego 
is one fully integrated into society, and what makes an 
ego dark, and, for that reason, sick, is being at odds with 
the environment in which it lives. Thus, the element 
which contributes the most to the ego of egoism is the 
intervention of “rationalization”, an innovation which 
throws this primordial polarity out of balance. In Roman 
legions, the Greek phalanx, the device which set them 
apart from the barbarians was discipline, obedience and 
collaboration around rationalized procedures, and to this 
day the consolidation of units of power remains the very 
foundation of civilization as we know it. Power and 
intellect are in uneasy alliance, power being ineffectual 
without the assistance of intellect, and intellect forever 
frustrated by a blind instinct which fulfils its drive in a 
condition, obedience, which demands the suspension of 
thought. 
 
The will to power as a biological urge is only a problem 
when it is understood in the terms of natural science, and 
as such is closer to the scepticism of Hume than it is to 
the iconoclasticism of Nietzsche. Nietzsche might have 
chosen less provocative terms in speaking of a drive that 
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manifests itself in ways both approved and condemned 
by society, but even if Nietzsche was guilty of a crude 
reduction, and in endorsing a value system based on a 
distorted view of human nature, this would not mean 
that there is nothing behind it. And the egoism of the 
individual who chooses to make the pursuit of power a 
guiding principle is not even the will to power at its most 
sinister. At its most destructive, the will to power is 
centred on the ego pole of collectivity, and fulfilled here 
through the reduction of individual egos to unconditional 
obedience for integration into a single body. Military 
cultures and all other cultures of obedience operate on 
the understanding that the more machine-like their 
mode of operation, the greater the power; and with the 
expenditure of energy in maintaining discipline, such 
cultures tend to exist in the perpetual need to discharge 
themselves. 
 
It should be clear that the egos of individualism and 
collectivism are not primordial, but are the result of 
conditions unique to modern times. There may be some 
question of which ego Nietzsche’s most resembles – the 
artless ego of an Achilles or the calculated self-interest 
of a Machiavellian prince? While the justice of an 
Agamemnon consists in the bestowal of honours where 
it is due, the virtue of an Achilles lies in the pursuit of 
honour even to the disregard of any instinct for self-
preservation. Although the lust for honour gnaws even 
at the vitals of those either too proud to pander to it, or 
mindful of the futility of ever satisfying it, the egoism 
of Nietzsche seems closest to that of Shakespeare’s 
Coriolanus. His is a solitary ego which disdains honours 
he considers beneath him, and which “needs no applause 
and clapping of hands, if only he is assured of his own 
hand-clapping” (Nietzsche, 1887/1974, p. 260). There is 
a nobility, and at the same time futility, in such an ego, 
which has the makings of a drama which is not only 
beyond good and evil, but also beyond tragedy, in that it 
is so seldom understood. 
 
Ego as Psychic 
 
Up to this point, this paper has kept exclusively to 
philosophy, phenomenology, and to primary sources. 
But, at the risk of a too abrupt a transition, we would 
like now to turn to the psychology of James Hillman. As 
a psychologist, he takes many a contrarian turn, and in 
this he follows in the footsteps of Nietzsche ... at least as 
a champion of multiplicity. To be sure, when he speaks 
of the ego as having its “base in archetypical principles 
of the hero myth” (Hillman, 1976, p. 40), he cannot 
be speaking of the egos of epistemology, or even the 
ego of ego identity. Although archetypes seem quite 
compatible with Heidegger’s historicality, a reduction of 
ego to cultural artifact surely is in violation of much that 
is phenomenological. But despite (if not in keeping with 
this) following Jung, Hillman also speaks of the ego as 
“personality Number One” that “rules the day world” 
(p. 32), and he sees therapy as involving “the freeing of 
the soul from its identity with the ego and the waking 
state” (p. 33), a work of deconstruction of the kind of 
ego integration that Scheler seems to advocate. 
 
To understand Hillman philosophically is to recognize 
that the psychic is not and cannot be “mental” in either 
the sense of ego movement or ego consciousness, and 
that it also defies apophantic conceptualization, that 
is, what Hillman would dismiss as “nominalism”. For 
Hillman, concepts are of no use in understanding the 
psychological, because the “psyche” is not of the mind, 
but of the imagination. “Images and metaphors present 
themselves always as living psychic subjects with which 
I am obliged to be in relation. They keep me aware of 
the power of the words I work with, whereas concepts 
tend to delude me into nominalism” (1976, p. 32). 
Archetypal psychology dances around such questions 
as the origins of archetypes and the exact material out 
of which they are made, but perhaps it would be fair to 
say that the imagination of myth is not the soul itself, but 
simply the way in which the psychic manifests itself. 
 
If the soul is not of imagination, perhaps it is time – 
as much as this seems to be a violation of everything 
archetypal – to think of it as ego. Perhaps Hillman does 
not get it quite right when he says “the ego is not the 
whole psyche, only one member of a community” (p. 
31). Rather, it might be more accurate to say that the 
soul is a community of egos, and that, as we rotate from 
ego to ego, we invent a unity that does not in fact exist. 
Perhaps this ego “Number One”, even should it manage 
to identify itself, is not as secure in its rule as we may 
imagine: that, while we worship one God, we, in our 
hearts, remain polytheistic. Ego integration exists as an 
ideal, and the forging of these multiple egos into a single 
unit is at best a work in progress. Like so many other 
modern ideals – reason, equality, freedom – we reach 
and, in our conceit, imagine that we grasp. 
 
Perhaps a minor point – but, just as it is possible to 
split an act of thought from a thought image, and the act 
of perception from a perceived image, the contention 
here is that the image of imagination can be separated 
from an action. Things imagined are in one way or 
another grounded in body, but only body that has under-
gone a certain transformation that renders it psychic. 
Transparency is a property of thought, or at least of that 
thought which is directed at communication. Things 
perceived can be made transparent in communicative 
acts by being pointed out, but this soul has nothing in it 
that can be made the object of pointing. There is no 
looking inward, only a looking outwards, and these 
outward manifestations of soul are the products of  
imagination. Mythology, metaphor, symbolism, story-
telling are ways of making visible that which defies 
being made transparent in any other way. And here we 
would speak of this otherwise opaque activity as ego, 
although there are any number of, and perhaps better, 
ways of conceiving it. 
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This ego cannot be instinct or “body” as Merleau-Ponty 
understood it. It certainly cannot be found in the “they” 
of Heidegger. This selfsame ego is the seat of anxiety, 
and just as solitude is known to amplify anxiety, being 
with others “brings Dasein a tranquillity” (Heidegger, 
1927/1962, p. 222). If the psychic is not rooted in 
community, that is, communal in the sense of being 
shared with others, then is not an archetype merely a 
way in which the psychic finds expression; an activity 
that is not of the light, but of the depths, and which seeks 
the light? It is in our dreams that this unseen psychic 
world becomes visible, and do our dreams not, much 
like our thoughts, reach towards expression? They speak 
not only of the underworld – for the underworld is not 
nearly as remote as we imagine it to be – but also of the 
day world. Not prophetically in the ancient, naïve sense, 
but still quite literally, in that they reveal our ego involve-
ments with others. Like “vital feelings”, our dreams can 
“reveal dangers and advantages, not through associations 
of experience, but directly, before I comprehend the 
intellectual sense of such dangers and advantages” 
(Scheler, 1916/1973a, p. 341). 
 
The only way that an archetype can be owned is as an 
ego that enjoys a particular standing in the community. 
Individuals remain divisible into distinctly separable 
selves, even though the laws of God and of men now 
hold only one of them accountable. Ancient times were 
different. Life was far more fragmented. Citizens took 
on roles (selves), many of which were sponsored by a 
god, but they did not make it a matter of conscience to 
clothe any particular self in the mantle of “Number 
One”. In moving from ego to ego, it was not incum-
bent on these different selves to maintain a logical 
consistency. The self of war did not live by the morality 
of hearth and home. The self of sensuality did not live by 
the morality of motherhood. And, above all, no one of 
these selves took it upon itself to pass judgment on the 
others. Nietzsche (1901/1967) saw “moral monsters” 
of this kind as “a contradiction of the classical”, and 
not least in so far as “Precisely a preponderance of one 
virtue over the others is hostile to the classical power 
of equilibrium” (Nietzsche, p. 441). Times have changed 
and so have the rules, but this does not mean that the 
ancients lived by no rules. Every self followed strict 
standards of conduct, each deeply rooted in some aspect 
of life and ordered to respect all the others. 
 
Ego as Being With 
 
While Hillman may be quite compatible with Scheler the 
theoretician, he seems altogether incompatible with 
Scheler the moralist ... or would be if he were to 
advocate a return to polytheism. What he proposes is an 
arrangement which is epistemologically quite consistent 
with Heidegger. “Until Descartes every thing present-at-
hand for itself was a ‘subject’, but now the ‘I’ becomes 
the special subject, that with regard to which all the 
remaining things first determine themselves as such” 
(Heidegger, 1967, p. 105). “In the language of the middle 
ages”, “a golden mountain” represented an “objectum”, 
whereas it “is, according to the usage of language of 
today, merely something ‘subjective’; for ‘a golden 
mountain’ does not exist ‘objectively’ in the meaning of 
the changed linguistic use” (p. 106). In what may seem 
like an inversion, what Hillman proposes is to reinstate 
the traditional meaning of the terms, thereby treating the 
“golden mountain” as real, and the “special subject” of 
subjectivity as an empty abstraction. 
 
When Hillman speaks of “literalizing”, he is inferring 
the direction the Cartesian ego takes in consolidation, 
and when speaking of “personification”, the direction 
needed for the deconstruction of the Cartesian ego and 
a return to multiplicity. What he advocates is ousting the 
monogenetic mythologies of science and restoring the 
polygenetic mythologies of tradition, and for no better 
reason than because they are more congenial to life. His 
epistemology would “dethrone the dominant fantasy 
ruling our view of the world as ultimately a unity” (p. 
41). A unified “subjectum” – such as found in natural 
science – that underpins objective reality exists only as 
a hypothetical – or, perhaps, a vague – goal. Hillman’s 
psychology is based on the realization that natural 
science can never accept psychic activities on their 
own terms as phenomena, and this would be of no 
consequence if it were not for the fact that, by weaving 
the Cartesian subject into the fabric of being, we are 
made unwitting accomplices in ego consolidation. 
 
Even though we long ago set aside the custom of 
imbuing the natural world with ego presences, every 
prominent feature of our world – whether geological 
or topiary, aquatic or subterranean – remains open to 
personification. And personification comes knocking 
because pathology, despite all our protestations, remains 
the rule which governs our lives, while rationality 
remains the hard won exception. This is not to advocate 
a return to life in the manner of the ancients. “For I can 
never again achieve the old naïveté; I can only under-
stand it” (Husserl, 1954/1970, p. 210). A mountain or 
river as god remains a superstition, but personification 
involves the recognition that, in order for it to be of the 
imagination, which is to say psychological, it must be 
taken for real. The monster in a child’s closet comes to 
life by being real. Pathologies hold sway over us by their 
being real, and would not be pathological if they could 
be reasoned with. 4 
 
In personalization, Hillman is far closer to Heidegger 
than to Husserl, and certainly the ego presence of a god 
                                                 
4 “Because something has become transparent to us, we 
think it will no longer offer us any resistance – and are 
then amazed when we discover we can see through it but 
cannot go through it! It is the same folly and amazement as 
overcomes the fly in face of a pane of glass.” (Nietzsche, 
1881/1997, p. 188) 
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is more a being with others in dasein than a being 
towards others in the solitude of intersubjectivity. The 
ego presence of a god is the stuff of dreams, and for this 
reason it has something in it of community. A god is a 
veiled presence which the imagination fills with images 
of fear and awe; which is to say, with ego. The Greek 
gods displayed all the signs: envious, forever taking 
offense at real or imagined affronts, engaging in 
intrigues against the other gods. And Homer’s audience 
was ever counselled to avoid hubris and be mindful that 
the “gods are stronger than men” (Homer, p. 370), 
presumably because the egos of mortals impinge on 
those of the gods. Personification is dreaming while 
awake; and even in dreams there is ego identity, even 
though it is fluid in a way that the ego of the daytime 
is not. And is it not this ego element that makes dreams 




The ego is not, nor ever can be, an apodictic given. It is 
a concept based on evidence gained from the experience 
of our response to others and theirs in return. The best 
evidence for the ego is not found in introspection, but 
out in the world among others, and even there it is 
available only in bits and pieces, fragments that we 
collect and synthesize into a nebulous whole and place 
in an imagined interior that we call self. The epistemolo-
gical egos of Descartes and Husserl, the ego of egoism, 
the heroic ego, or the ego of Scheler’s lived body, or 
any of the other commonly spoken of egos, converge at 
a single point, and that is in solitude, but a solitude that 
makes its presence felt in others. 
 
Phenomenology often seems faced with an either-or, 
neither of which seems entirely satisfactory. Whereas 
intersubjectivity demands what Husserl (1954/1970) 
characterises as “a unique sort of philosophical solitude” 
(p. 184), Heidegger (1927/1962) would claim that 
“authentic being-one’s-self” cannot be “detached from 
the ‘they’” but “is rather an existentiell modification 
of the ‘they’” (p. 168). It thus becomes a matter of 
choosing either solitude, which is to say Husserl’s 
ego, or else Heidegger’s “they”, which is to say the 
“equiprimordiality” (p. 170) of community in the object. 
Then there is Merleau-Ponty’s doctrine of the priority 
of perception, which would commit to neither. Is it not 
conceivable that self may be both of solitude and of 
community? Even as we bathe in the presence of others, 
can we not sense veiled ego operations that are inter-
subjective in nature? Behind every ego presence we 
divine an ego, and in it we unconsciously accept the 
existence of processes which might be accessed through 
participation in a shared solitude. 
 
Phenomenology is faced with a similar either-or with 
regard to the priority of perception. Is there not perhaps a 
doubling in which perception is indeed prior, but in 
which it is coupled with an image which is something 
of community as well as of solitude? The facial or bodily 
motions of others can be perceived as things, but it is 
through the sightedness of imagination that we see the 
waxing and waning of ego and the animations which 
constitute selfhood. Of beauty and of youth, of manner 
and force of personality: these are sensed by means other 
than perception. Even in the things themselves, lurking 
behind perception, there is an image which is of soul, a 
doubling that can be observed in a peculiar flickering 
ambience, particularly acute in the experience of déjà 
vu. Perception is always on the verge of disengagement 
from the thing perceived to the “actus re-flexivus” of 
imagination, from the sightedness of the body to the 
sightedness of the lived ego. 
 
If imagination is neither of mind nor of body, then what 
is it? Certainly, a thought image is different from a 
dream image, even though both would seem to draw 
on perception. And surely a dream image is as much of 
solitude as it is of community, although dreams reach 
for communication by making themselves conscious. 
How togetherness in community is accessed is through 
imitation, by participation in pre-existing forms of 
behaviour as well as forms of communication. And if 
it is erroneous, if not harmful, to reduce soul to mind, 
imagination to thought, is it not equally erroneous to 
reduce soul to mimicry, or to treat it as the spawn of 
culture? It is a question of whether soul is primarily 
the stuff of cultural antecedents with existential 
modifications, or whether it can be better understood 
as composed of solitude shaped by our dealing with 
others. And the answer we make to this question has 
profound implications for our understanding and the 
manner in which we conduct research, as well as for 
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